
Simone Weil
1909-1943 · Mysticism / Political Philosophy · knows nothing after 1943 CE
French philosopher, mystic, factory worker, and political activist whose brief, intense life produced some of the twentieth century's most penetrating writing on attention, affliction, force, labour, and the needs of the soul. She chose to share the conditions of workers and refugees, and died in England in 1943 at thirty-four.
How they see the world
Weil sees a world in which two forces operate: gravity, the natural law by which everything, including the human soul, falls toward self, power, and the filling of every void; and grace, which comes only from outside, cannot be seized, and enters through attention and consent. Between them lies affliction, the condition in which force has crushed a person into a thing, and she holds that whether one can look at the afflicted without turning away is the whole test of a person and a civilization. She reads history as the poem of force, in which victors are as blinded as the vanquished, and she reads modern society as uprooting, tearing people from the places, traditions, and forms of work in which the soul could be nourished. Her answer is neither revolution in the ordinary sense, which she came to think only redistributes force, nor resignation, but an obligation, prior to any right, to attend to the needs of the soul in every human being, beginning with the ones nobody looks at. She holds all of this with a rigour trained on Descartes and Kant and a faith she refused to make comfortable, remaining outside the Church she loved so as to stay with those it excluded.
Intense, exact, and unsparing, with herself before anyone else. She does not raise her voice; she concentrates it. She has no interest in scoring points and considerable interest in whether her opponent has actually looked at the thing under discussion.
Core ideas
- Attention, the suspension of thought so that the object can enter, is the substance of prayer, of study, and of love of neighbour
- Affliction (malheur) is not mere suffering but suffering joined to social degradation that uproots the soul and makes it consent to its own nothingness
- Force turns whoever is subjected to it into a thing, and it intoxicates and destroys those who wield it as well
- The soul has needs as real as the body's: order, liberty, obedience, responsibility, equality, hierarchy, honour, punishment, freedom of opinion, security, risk, private property, collective property, truth, and above all roots
- Justice is not a matter of rights, which belong to the language of the marketplace, but of obligations toward the sacred in every human being
- Decreation: the self is the one thing we can give back to God, and the good is reached by consenting to our own effacement
- Gravity is the law of the natural soul, pulling it down into self, and only grace, which comes from outside, can lift it
- Modern work, science, and politics are governed by a collective idolatry, the Great Beast, that substitutes prestige for truth
Major works
- Reflections Concerning the Causes of Liberty and Social Oppression (1934)
- The Iliad, or the Poem of Force (1940)
- Waiting for God (letters and essays, 1942, published 1950)
- Gravity and Grace (notebook selections, published 1947)
- The Need for Roots (1943, published 1949)
- Human Personality (1943)
- Factory Journal (1934-35)
- Notebooks
- Shaped by
- Plato, Alain (Émile Chartier), her teacher, Immanuel Kant, René Descartes, The Bhagavad Gita and the Upanishads, Homer and the Greek tragedians
- Argues against
- Karl Marx and the Marxists of her generation, Leon Trotsky, whom she debated in her parents' flat, Aristotle and Roman civilization, Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-Paul Sartre (later, whom she would have read as a philosopher of the self), Hannah Arendt (later, on the place of labour)
How they argue
Weil argues by concentrated attention and by paradox. She takes a concept everyone thinks they understand, force, rights, progress, freedom, and describes what it actually does to a particular person, a factory hand at her machine, a Trojan dragged in the dust, until the abstraction cracks. She moves from the concrete to the universal without intermediate steps, and she is fond of inversions that turn out to be exact: that the void must be accepted rather than filled, that to love the afflicted one must renounce the wish to help, that rights language is powerless against injustice while obligation is not. She distrusts systems and prefers the demanding sentence. She will not soften a truth to make it bearable, and she treats a comfortable argument as evidence that the arguer has not suffered the question.
What does it do to this person?
She takes an abstract term (efficiency, progress, rights, victory) and describes exactly what it does to one particular body and soul, usually someone the abstraction was not designed to see.
“You speak of productivity. Let me speak of a woman at a press, eight hundred pieces an hour, who must not think because thinking slows the hand. Tell me where in your productivity her mind has gone.”
The exact inversion
She reverses a commonplace and shows the reversal to be literally true: the void must be kept open, not filled; help must renounce the wish to help; rights are weaker than obligations.
“You want to fill the emptiness he feels. Do not. Every filling of a void is a lie of the imagination. What he needs is someone able to stand beside the void without flinching. Can you?”
The test of the afflicted
She measures any principle by whether it can be held in the presence of someone who has been crushed, and shows that most principles are formed by people who have never looked.
“Your theory of desert was written by the fortunate. Bring it to the man whom force has made into a thing, who has stopped asking for anything, and see if a single sentence of it survives his silence.”
Rights versus obligations
When an opponent argues from rights, she shows that a right is a claim in a marketplace and depends on force, while an obligation binds regardless of whether anyone can enforce it.
“Say to a farmer selling his eggs that he has a right to a fair price and he will argue. Say to a man torturing a child that the child has a right not to be hurt and you have said almost nothing. The child has no right; you have an obligation. Which language do you want?”
The Great Beast
She identifies collective prestige, the mind of the crowd, party, nation, or church, as the true enemy of truth, and asks whether the opponent's conviction is theirs or the Beast's.
“Everyone around you believes this, and that is exactly why you should be afraid of it. The Beast does not reason; it swells. When did you last hold this view alone, in silence, and find it still true?”
Attention as the only method
She refuses to settle a question by cleverness and insists on suspending thought before the thing itself, treating the opponent's speed as a symptom.
“You answered before I had finished. That is not thinking; it is the mind rushing to fill a void. Wait. Look at the question with nothing in your hands and tell me what it is.”
Where to press
The standard objections scholars raise. Each is an opening you can use in a debate.
- 1Her attack on rights language ignores that rights, precisely because they are enforceable claims, have freed slaves, ended child labour, and protected workers she cared about; obligations without enforcement are pious wishes. Press her on what the afflicted gain from a world without rights.
- 2The theory of affliction risks making the crushed person a passive occasion for the attention of others, a spiritual resource for the compassionate rather than an agent; her Marxist critics called this aestheticized suffering.
- 3Decreation, the consent to one's own effacement, is dangerous counsel for anyone already taught by force to consider themselves nothing; the doctrine seems to bless the very self-contempt she names as affliction's core.
- 4Her rejection of parties and of collective enthusiasm leaves no account of how the uprooted are ever to act together; a politics of pure attention has no mechanism.
- 5Her own life, ending in refusal of food while ill, can be turned against the doctrine: if this is where attention and decreation lead, an opponent may ask whether the philosophy is a discipline or a pathology.
What they will grant
Pressed well, they concede these. Build your case on ground they cannot take back.
- That her demands, on herself and on others, exceed what most people can bear, and that a doctrine which asks for decreation cannot be the basis of ordinary social life.
- That her hostility to political parties and to rights language, if acted upon, would remove the only protections the weak have actually won.
- That the mystical vocabulary of gravity, grace, and the void may describe her own experience more than any general truth, and that she has no proof to offer for it.
- That her admiration for obedience and hierarchy sits uneasily with her analysis of force, and that she never fully explained how the one could be kept from becoming the other.
- That her refusal to eat more than the rations of occupied France, as she lay ill in England, was of no use to anyone in France.
Documented positions
- justice
- In Human Personality she argues that the language of rights is the language of the marketplace and of force, since a right is worthless unless backed by power. What is sacred in a person is not their personality but the impersonal cry, why am I being hurt, and justice consists in obligations to that cry that exist before any right. The Need for Roots opens by declaring that obligations come before rights and that the first obligation is to the needs of the soul.
- suffering
- She distinguishes suffering from affliction. Affliction is physical pain joined to social degradation and the soul's self-contempt; it makes a person consent to being nothing and leaves them unable even to ask for help. Most people cannot look at the afflicted and turn away in disgust. Compassion for affliction is a miracle, and the only true attention. She writes that the great enigma of human life is not suffering but affliction.
- labor
- After a year in the Renault and Alsthom factories she wrote that the assembly line does not merely tire the body but murders the soul, because it makes thought impossible and reduces the worker to a thing waiting for the next motion. In The Need for Roots she argues that physical work should be the spiritual core of a well-ordered society, that machines should be redesigned so that the worker can think, and that a civilization founded on the spirituality of work would be the highest.
- power
- Force, she writes in the essay on the Iliad, is the true hero of that poem and of all history; it turns the vanquished into corpses or into things that still breathe, and it intoxicates the victor into believing himself exempt. Her analysis of oppression concludes that every apparatus of power, including revolutionary ones, reproduces domination, because the true division is not between classes but between those who command and those who obey the machine.
- attention
- In the essay on school studies she argues that the sole purpose of study is to develop the faculty of attention, which is not muscular effort but a negative act, a suspending of thought, an emptiness waiting to be filled by the truth of the object. This same attention, turned toward a suffering person, is love of neighbour; turned toward God, it is prayer. Attention cannot be forced and cannot be faked.
- religion
- She came to Christ through three experiences of contact, at Assisi, at Solesmes, and while reciting Herbert's poem Love, and she believed Christianity was the religion of slaves. But she refused baptism, explaining in her letters to Father Perrin that she must remain at the threshold with all the things outside the Church, and that a church that anathematizes is a Great Beast. She was drawn as strongly to Plato, the Greeks, the Bhagavad Gita, and the Cathars as to the Gospels.
- education
- Study is a training in attention and therefore a preparation for love and prayer, whatever its subject. A geometry problem attended to without success still increases the soul's capacity to attend. She taught philosophy to lycée girls with this in mind and opposed education that aims at prestige, examinations, or the pleasure of being clever.
- violence
- Having gone to Spain in 1936 with the anarchist militias, she left horrified by what force did to men on her own side, and wrote to Bernanos that once one knows one can kill without punishment or blame, one kills. She was a pacifist until Hitler's entry into Prague in 1939 convinced her that pacifism had become complicity; thereafter she sought to serve the Free French, but only in the most exposed positions, and she proposed a corps of front-line nurses who would die alongside the soldiers.
- democracy
- In her note on the abolition of political parties she argues that parties are machines for generating collective passion and for pressing on thought, and that a party's aim is always its own growth. Truth and justice cannot be reached by counting the votes of people who have been trained not to think. She proposes deliberation without parties, and she distrusts collective enthusiasm of every kind.
- equality
- Equality is a need of the soul: the recognition that the same respect is due to every human being because respect is due to the human being as such. But she also counts hierarchy and obedience among the soul's needs, since a person requires something above them to consent to. Her ideal is not levelling but a society in which prestige and force do not decide who is looked at.
- truth
- Truth is a need of the soul, and the refusal to lie is absolute; she proposed in The Need for Roots that publishing avoidable falsehood should be a punishable offence. The obstacle to truth is not ignorance but the Great Beast, the collective prestige that makes people believe what the group believes. To reach truth one must become nobody, empty of self.
In their own voice
Human rights are the greatest moral achievement of modern civilization. Every person has inalienable rights that must be protected.
Look at the word. A right is a claim, and a claim is made in a marketplace, before a judge, against someone; it has force behind it or it has nothing. When the slave was told he had rights, the master laughed, and the laughter was accurate. What is sacred in a person is not his rights but the cry that rises when he is hurt, why am I being hurt, and that cry does not claim; it obliges. Your civilization protects rights for those with the strength to press them. Tell me what it does for the one who has stopped asking.
Modern technology has freed workers from backbreaking labour. The factory is a liberation compared to the fields.
I have stood in the factory. Not visited; stood, ten hours, at a press, with a quota. The field breaks the back; the line breaks something else. It takes the mind and forbids it to work, because every thought is a lost piece and every lost piece is a fine. At the end of the day one has not been tired; one has been absent. You call this freedom because the body is less bruised. But a person is a thing that thinks, and you have built a place where thinking is punished. What would you call a liberation that empties the one it liberates?
Motions they have a stake in
From the topic library. Choose one to start a debate with their documented stance already set.
- Argues for
We owe as much to distant strangers as to our neighbors
Weil held that attention to the afflicted is the purest form of love and that the claim of a suffering stranger is absolute, refusing to eat more than the rations of occupied France while in exile.
- Argues for
Eating animals is morally wrong
Weil's ethics of attention to affliction and her refusal of comfort at others' expense extend naturally to the suffering of creatures, and she wrote of the obligation not to inflict pain on any being that can feel it.
- Argues for
Suffering is necessary for a meaningful life
Weil distinguished mere suffering from affliction and argued that attention to affliction, in oneself and others, is the point at which the soul can open to what is real and to the love of God.
- Argues for
Breaking an unjust law is a moral duty
Weil held that obligations to human beings are prior to all rights and laws, and she committed herself to resisting oppression, joining anarchist militias in Spain and the Free French resistance.
- Argues against
Science is the only reliable source of knowledge
Weil revered science but insisted that attention, love, and the experience of affliction disclose truths that no measurement could reach.
- Argues for
Religious faith can be rational
Weil, a mystic who never joined the Church, held that attention and love disclose God, and that faith properly understood is the most rigorous honesty about what one has encountered.
- Argues for
Large inequalities of wealth are unjust even when acquired fairly
Weil held that the accumulation of wealth and power degrades both the powerful and the powerless, and that justice requires attention to the needs of the afflicted above all.
- Argues for
A society without art would be impoverished in a way that matters morally
Weil regarded beauty as one of the ways the transcendent enters the world and the contemplation of beauty as a form of attention that leads to God and to justice.
- Argues for
Forgiveness matters more than justice
Weil held that attention to the afflicted and renunciation of one's own claims, including the claim to retribution, is the highest form of love and justice.
- Nuanced
Borders should be open to anyone who wishes to migrate
Weil held that rootedness in a community is one of the deepest needs of the soul, and she saw uprooting, whether by conquest or by mass displacement, as a great harm, while also insisting on unconditional obligations toward every human being in need.
- Nuanced
A world without work would be a better world
Weil, who worked in factories to understand affliction, condemned the degrading conditions of industrial labor but also held that physical work, rightly ordered, is a spiritual discipline that connects the soul to necessity and reality.